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GRAPHICAL ABSTRACT 
 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 A positive role of central government control on firm value versus a negative one of its local 
peers. 
 A  U-shaped relationship between ownership concentration and firm value despite a high 
inflection point. 
 Higher government quality enhances the positive effect of central government control while 
mitigating the negative impact of local government control.  
 The relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is attenuated by financial 
development, indicating the substitution effect between internal and external monitoring 
mechanisms. 
 Empirical evidence for the institutional embeddedness of Chinese corporate governance. 
 
Abstract 
The distinctive political-economic setups of emerging economies engender 
special corporate governance issues that warrant added attention to the broader 
institutional environments.  Using a unique provincial firm-level dataset, this 
paper investigates how corporate control natures, ownership concentration, and 
provincial differences in government quality and financial development jointly 
affect the value of Chinese listed companies. Firstly, central government control 
is generally associated with higher Tobin’s Q, while a negative premium is 
found for firms ultimately controlled by local governments. It then uses 
alternative concentration measures and an instrumental variable approach to 
confirm a nonlinear relationship between ownership concentration and Tobin’s 
Q, implying that firm value first decreases and then increases as blockholders 
own more shares. Further analysis reveals that government quality has a 
significant, positive moderating effect on the relationship between different 
corporate controllers and firm value, while the value implication of ownership 
concentration also depends on regional financial development. 
Key Words: corporate governance, firm value, government quality, financial 
development, corporate control, ownership concentration 
JEL Classification: G31 H77 P30 P48 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
 
Corporate governance (CG) researchers often attribute first-order importance to 
investor protection in destemming firm performance. For the legal finance 
scholarship in particular, effective investor protection critically hinges upon CG 
mechanisms and legal environment in situ (La Porta et al., 2000). Disparities in 
legal systems and enforcement effects are taken as a key institutional factor 
whether it is to understand the diversity of national CG models (Mintz, 2005), 
or the causal links between particular CG practices and economic outcomes 
(Hearan et al., 2017). 
Nevertheless, consideration of legal factors alone may be inadequate to capture 
the full complexity of all institutional dimensions implicated in CG practices 
and firm valuation (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2013). Policy prescriptions 
enshrined in codes of ‘best’ practices are mostly mediated by political and 
economic realities and achieve limited effects (Ahrens et al., 2011). This is 
particularly so in those emerging markets where judicial inefficiency and 
government intervention render regulatory enforcement especially problematic. 
To the extent that the key actors’ interests and behaviors are shaped by the 
distinctive institutional contexts, the dynamics and accompanying CG conflicts 
necessarily differ from those found elsewhere. Thus the relations between CG 
practices and performance outcomes warrant added attention to other 
background institutions (Filatotchev et al., 2013). 
Yet, the claim that institutions matter for organisational performance and even 
economic growth has so far received a more extensive theoretical treatment than 
an empirical or methodological one (Buchanan et al., 2014). This study aims to 
fill this gap by examining empirically how particular ownership characteristics 
and institutional factors jointly affect the value of Chines listed companies. We 
focus on ownership structure rather than other firm-specific CG mechanisms for 
the former decides the relative power and conflicts between different 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), and therefore explains the economic 
efficiency of the corporations they control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
China’s unique political-economic system provides an apposite research 
context. Although China’s economic reform has so far been state-guided, it has 
also been a highly decentralised process with considerable autonomy granted to 
local bureaucracies (Heilmann, 2011). This gives rise to notable variation in 
local socioeconomic conditions, making it possible to compare the different 
institutional domains and their implications for CG practices and firm 
performance. Hasan et al. (2009) find that focusing on a single nation also helps 
control for heterogeneity in national cultures and political institutions as 
encountered in much cross-national research.  
This study differs from the prevailing research on Chinese CG in several 
respects. First, it distinguishes different corporate control natures by manually 
tracing the identities of ultimate controllers along the ownership chains. In 
China holders of a given share class such as legal person shares typically consist 
of heterogeneous entities, ranging from quasi-administrative agents and central-
controlled corporations to private individuals. They act as the intermediate 
agents for the different, ultimate controllers. The latter often imposes specific 
objectives and priorities on companies in ways that clearly impinge upon the 
evident market value. Consequently, relying on legal classification alone, as 
done in many previous studies, obscures the objectives and motivations of these 
various controllers, and has yielded mixed results when explaining their 
performance implications. 
Secondly, ownership concentration of Chinese firms is mostly measured by 
aggregate ownership held by top-ranked shareholders (e.g. Chen et al., 2009). 
This study only examines the equity stakes that are above 5% of the outstanding 
shares to take into account the disproportionate influences from one or a few 
blockholders. The Herfindahl index of top 10 shareholdings is also applied for it 
assigns more weight to the very large shareholding positions and produces 
consistent results. To gain robustness, the nonlinear relationship between 
ownership concentration, legal protection, and firm value is tested using a new 
instrumental variable. 
Thirdly, this paper makes the first attempt to understand the impact on the firm 
value of subnational-level policy environments. While the quality of public 
policies may depend on other institutions such as laws and the constitutions, 
such conventional constraints on executive power are relatively ineffectual in 
regulating the behaviors of officials in China, as with other emerging economies. 
Therefore, the quality of government policies, or ultimately the quality of 
bureaucrats and politicians who make the policies, is a critical impacting factor 
of Chinese firm performance and deserves separate attention in the analysis of 
Chinese firm valuation. 
Last but not least, besides legal systems and firm-level mechanisms, 
competitions in real factor markets also help mitigate CG problems. The former 
includes all input and output markets, ranging from labor and raw materials to 
finance and distribution services (Khemani and Leechor, 2001). Januszewski et 
al. (2002) find that product market competition and concentrated ownership are 
complementary in enhancing German firm performance. Yet evidence on the 
role of factor market development in relation to CG is still limited. China’s 
accession to the WTO and the ongoing enterprise reform promotes the 
deregulation of regional financial markets. An interesting question is whether a 
similar relation exists between financial development, ownership concentration, 
and firm value. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the 
political and economic institutions pertaining to Chinese CG. Section 3 assesses 
their potential impacts on Chinese firm value and develops appropriate 
hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the database, variables, and methodological 
issues. Section 5 reports empirical results, with robustness tests described in 
Section 6. The concluding section contains a summary and implications. 
2. Institutional Context of Chinese CG 
As China’s state subsidies to loss-making state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
reached untenable levels in the late 1980s, it was clear that more profound 
structural changes in the government-enterprise relationship were needed. Since 
then CG has been identified by the Chinese authorities as the core element of 
the “modern enterprise system” designated to promote enterprise performance 
and to redress incentive problems (Tenev et al., 2002:16). Many reform policies 
including the corporatization scheme commencing in the mid-1990s involved 
parallel changes in different institutional realms, as will be discussed below. 
First, in the course of ‘grasping the large and releasing the small’, the central 
government retained control over a relatively small number of large 
corporations in the commanding heights (Lin and Milhaupt, 2013). Further 
regulatory reforms included the establishment of a central State Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) aiming to integrate the 
once fragmented state ownership rights performed by different line ministries 
and functional commissions. Meanwhile, many small and medium-sized, 
primarily loss-making SOEs underwent outright privatization. The rest was 
restructured into a variety of non-state forms through the expansion of 
shareholding systems, the formation of joint ventures, or sales to interested 
parties. The pace and patterns of these changes were decided by local 
bureaucracies who calculated their strategies based on local resources and 
political interests (Heilmann, 2011). This led to a further division of the SOE 
ownership rights, reflecting the federalism so characteristic of China’s central-
local relations. Prevailing CG studies generally employ a simple state-private 
ownership dichotomy when analyzing the ownership impact on firm 
performance. As Nee et al. (2007) suggest, the central and local bureaucracies 
are likely to face different policy imperatives and monitoring capabilities that 
may lead to distinctive impacts on how enterprises should be managed and run. 
Second, Chinese government follows a top-down legalistic approach to 
transplant the basic structures of CG from the external market-based model 
found in the Anglo-American system (OECD, 2011). To date, however, Chinese 
listed companies are characterized by highly concentrated ownership, primarily 
in the hands of stable government agencies or private individuals. As with many 
other emerging economies, concentrated ownership and weak legal institutions 
are considered as the “root cause” of investor expropriation (Young et al., 2008: 
200). Nevertheless, concentrated ownership can substitute for weak institutional 
environments in capital, labor, and product markets that confront most Chinese 
private-controlled firms. Milhaupt and Zheng (2015) note that the notion of 
state ownership dominance is rooted in the country’s socialist ideology. It plays 
a vital role in securing the loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party from its key 
constituencies. For the private-controlled firms, the costly enforcement of arm’s 
length contracts means that the entrepreneurs and/or founders have to rely on 
concentrated ownership to keep potential managerial opportunism in check 
(Dharwadkar, et al., 2000). 
Third, along with the large-scale restructuring in the SOE sector, both the 
central and provincial governments frequently revise or reformulate industrial 
priorities in an effort to single out future winners and losers in the ongoing 
structural transformation of the economy. Common instruments such as market 
entry regulation, taxation, and loan decisions are part of government’s toolkit to 
influence the direction of structural transformation (Lu et al., 2013). The 
literature on China’s local state corporatism underscores the diverse roles of the 
regional governments as the producers, planners, and regulators of local 
economies (Shen and Tsai, 2016). 
Moreover, the lower-level government officials, with newly-granted 
administrative autonomy and ready access to local information, are well 
positioned to interfere with major corporate decisions ranging from resource 
procurement and personnel selection to financing and overseas investments 
(Duckett, 2001). However, excessive bureaucratic intervention coupled with 
relation-based business practices contradicts the fiduciary spirit and principle of 
arm’s length transactions which constitute a cornerstone of modern CG (Tam, 
2002). As such, the quality of government policies and ultimately the quality of 
bureaucrats and politicians who are responsible for the policy formulation can 
exert a critical impact on Chinese firm value (La Porta et al., 1999). 
Finally, the corporatization scheme coupled with the declining central budget 
necessitated the growth of domestic financial markets as alternative capital 
sources. The accession to the WTO further accelerated the financial market 
development in the mainland, including granting more autonomy in investment 
decision-making and credit allocation to state-owned financial institutions, 
removing restrictions on their ownership structure, and relaxing geographical 
and legal restrictions on the entry of new financial intermediaries (He, 2012). 
For Holmström and Tirole (1989), a well-functioning financial market 
contributes to greater investor protection by mitigating the information 
asymmetry between corporate insiders and public investors. However, the local 
governments continue to interfere with the functioning of the market by 
directing certain loans or stock listing while discouraging others (Sapienza, 
2004). To the extent that undue government discretion reduces the mobility and 
integration of the domestic financial market, the efficacy of the financial market 
in firm monitoring may be mitigated. 
3. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Recent development in comparative CG studies underscores the embeddedness 
of CG in national political and economic institutions.  They go beyond the 
stylized convergence-divergence debate and argue that in order to better 
understand the diversity and changing dynamics of national CG systems more 
attention should be devoted to path-dependency legacies and national 
institutional settings (Schiehll et al., 2016). 
Drawing on literature from multiple disciplines, the hypothesis development 
revolves around the value implications of the firm-specific ownership attributes 
and the underlying institutional factors highlighted above, as well as their 
interactions. Further discussion of their interactions will explore how the 
particular relationships between ownership characteristics and firm value may 
vary across different institutional environments. 
3.1 Corporate Control Nature 
Neoclassical economists posit that “private ownership should generally be 
preferred to public ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain 
cost must be strong” (Shleifer, 1998: 147). Specifically, because the wealth of 
private controllers is so closely linked to firm welfare, they are more single-
mindedly focused on cost saving and profit maximization than governments. 
With the specialized knowledge of firms’ technology, private controllers can 
easily enter into the management function and supervise firm operations to 
assure capital is deployed sparingly and used intensively (Che and Langli, 2015). 
On the other hand, private controllers often expropriate firm resources and 
appoint unqualified family members to key posts. Schulze et al. (2003) argue 
that family relations may make agency conflicts more difficult to resolve 
because relations between principals (family owners) and agents (family-
member managers) are based on emotions, sentiments, and informal linkages, 
resulting in the less effective monitoring of family managers. For Chen et al. 
(2009), the fact that China’s private corporate controllers are out of the 
regulatory scope of the state asset management agencies renders public 
investors more vulnerable to asset tunneling and share price manipulation. 
As to the state sector, local governments in China retain significant autonomy 
over the operation and revenue disposition of local state-owned enterprises 
(LSOEs) under the decentralized governance framework mentioned earlier. The 
interests and policy imperatives of local governments as corporate controllers 
are most influenced by the local social, political and economic conditions and 
therefore are likely to differ from those of the central agencies (Oi, 2011). The 
expanded supervisory and fiscal autonomy offer local bureaucracies greater 
latitude of discretion and thus LSOEs are often charged with nonfinancial 
objectives ranging from infrastructure financing to unemployment prevention 
and welfare provision (Zeng and Tsai, 2011). This not only raises difficulties in 
management monitoring and capital budgeting but also dilutes the profit-
making motives of local governments as corporate controllers when various 
social and political objectives collide with the firms’ profit goals (Sappington 
and Stiglitz, 1987). Consequentially, LSOEs’ resources are often diverted into 
unprofitable, speculative or duplicative investments (OECD, 2009). 
Moreover, to maintain the ownership control over a relatively large number of 
enterprises within the jurisdiction, a municipal government typically relies on a 
multitier asset management system consisting of secondary or even tertiary-
level monitoring agencies (Peng, 2001). The undue organizational complexity, 
intertwined with goal multiplicity, increases information distortion and further 
diffuses the government’s property rights and monitoring efforts. Chen et al. 
(2009) caution that the farther local agents are from the central authority, the 
more difficult it is to enforce laws and regulations. The fact that LSOEs are 
subject to weaker regulatory oversights creates fertile ground for predation and 
rent-seeking by local bureaucracies (Cheung et al., 2010). 
By contrast, through a centralized asset supervision system, the central 
government “now has stronger, although far from perfect, control” over the 
operation and investment of central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs), bringing 
problems of state asset stripping and insider trading under control (Mattlin, 
2009: 22). Yeo (2013) notes that the selection and compensation criteria for 
CSOEs’ directors and managers become increasingly market-driven and such 
issues as profitability, liquidity, risk control and operational costs are among the 
major criteria against which managerial performance in the CSOEs is evaluated. 
As a result, Chinese CSOEs and their subsidiaries are subject to more stringent 
and comprehensive supervision than their local peers.  
In its pursuit of nurturing ‘national champions’, the central government also 
channels enormous resources to a handful of large enterprises in key industrial 
sectors (Guest and Sutherland, 2010). CSOEs benefit from a range of 
preferential policies and treatments in areas ranging from taxation and 
technology transfer to material supplies and state-owned bank loans. Thus the 
central government’s ‘helping hand’ (Frye and Shleifer, 1997) substitutes for 
weak institutional environments in factor, labor and capital markets and 
provides CSOEs and their subsidiaries certain advantages that would otherwise 
be impossible. Matlin (2011) finds that having the central government as the 
implicit debt guarantor effectively mitigated the financial constraints of CSOEs 
over the 2008 global financial crisis. 
In summary, it is hard to know a priori the impact on the firm value of private 
controllers given the conflicting arguments discussed above. However, the 
divergent policy imperatives and monitoring capacities between the central and 
local governments are likely to exert contrasting effects on the Chinese firm 
value. Specifically, the excessive intervention and lax supervision by the local 
officials may increase expropriation risk and thus impair LSOE value, whereas 
CSOEs are advantaged by the easier access to necessary resources, and the 
better risk bearing and benefit sharing mechanisms. 
3.2 Ownership Concentration 
Owing to their significant equity holdings, major shareholders typically have 
stronger incentives and power to discipline management and remedy the free-
rider problem associated with dispersed ownership (Heugens et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, significant equity positions can obviously tempt large 
shareholders to expropriate from minority investors by assuming control of the 
firm and depriving the latter of the returns due on their investments (Li and 
Qian, 2013). Whereas expropriation can occur anywhere, it is especially 
common in emerging markets where property rights are weakly enforced and 
there are but few rules and procedures to protect minority shareholders 
(Claessens et al., 2000). 
The competing arguments imply the possibility of a nonmonotonic relation 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) noted that Tobin’s Q increases with insider shareholdings up to 
some 40% of total outstanding shares and decreases after. Kvist et al. (2006) 
report a similar nonlinear effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance as measured by market-to-book ratio and asset returns. Busta et al. 
(2014) find that the bell-shaped relationship can be moderated by the 
institutional environment proxied by legal families among European banks. 
Yet an opposite, U-shaped pattern, if anything, has been observed among the 
Chinese firms (Liu et al., 2012). In CG systems with relatively weak legal 
protection such as mainland China, expropriation is lucrative and feasible for 
blockholders as they exclusively capture the entire benefit but only bear costs 
proportional to their equity positions. Nevertheless, as their ownership increases, 
doing so would simply result in a direct transfer of private wealth from one 
venture into another, which is unlikely to benefit themselves except perhaps for 
fiscal seasons. Thus, the most effective strategy for increasing their private 
benefits is to forego wealth extraction and gear the firms for higher performance. 
We expect that as blockholders own more shares, the Chinese firm value is 
likely to first decrease and then increase. 
3.3 Government Quality 
According to Fan et al. (2011), government quality is the extent to which the 
decisions of bureaucrats and politicians benefit the citizens they serve: whether 
the decisions are made and executed in a legally and socially acceptable manner 
To a significant extent, the policy imperatives and behaviors of Chinese 
bureaucracies can be best explained by a combination of local economic and 
political structures (Zeng and Tsai, 2011). Specifically, progress in regional 
market liberalization reflects the strength of property rights protection, the 
fairness of the judicial system, the extent of allowance and tolerance of local 
governments to the private sector and extent of local entrepreneurship (Choi et 
al., 2015). This is because the competitive pressure unleashed by market 
deregulation coupled with the quest for fiscal revenue compels local officials to 
act as the promoters and protectors of local businesses. 
The competitive pressure from the rising non-state sector and ultimately the 
government quality also has powerful implications for the incentives of the 
Chinese governments as corporate controllers, and the way of exercising their 
power. Li and Zhou (2005) note that under a merit-based appraisal system, 
improving state asset value or reversing declining earnings amidst increased 
competition, becomes the crucial work target and evaluation criteria for the 
career progression of SOE cadres. Such political incentives deter the 
government corporate controllers from undue predation and expropriation 
(Duckett, 2011), and reinforces what Shevchenko (2004; 162) termed “the 
entrepreneurial adaptation” of the local government officials to increased 
market competition at both the central and local levels. 
Kwon (2005) notes that the balance between the ‘helping’ and ‘grabbing’ hand 
of a government is not clear-cut but hinges on the extent to which the excessive 
intervention can be curtailed. Meanwhile, the imperative for them to mandate 
extra and/or noneconomic burdens on the SOEs may become less pronounced, 
inasmuch as the expanding non-state sector provides alternative sources of 
investment and employment (Gordon and Li, 2011). The alleviated goal 
multiplicity reduces the possibilities of rent-seeking and relation-based business 
conducts that would otherwise impair the value of the state assets.  
As such, improved government quality leads to a more growth-oriented policy 
environment and fosters a business culture more consistent with shareholder 
wealth accumulation (OECD, 2009). It also implies alleviated goal multiplicity 
and stronger market orientation among the SOE cadres. Therefore, it is expected 
that higher government quality can increase Chinese firm value, and in 
particular enhance the positive effect of central government control while 
mitigating the negative effect of local government control. 
3.4 Financial Development 
A larger and more liquid financial market enables asset prices to incorporate 
information regarding the business operation and growth prospect in a faster 
and more cost-effective manner (Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998). For 
Huyghebaert and Wang (2012), improved information flow is arguably valuable 
for scrutinizing the actions of managers and even of majority shareholders, 
thereby alleviating the perceived risk of expropriation. They further argue that 
financial development stimulates the growth of legal and financial services that 
can act as both the information providers and management monitors. Pistor and 
Xu (2005) stress the key role of legal and accountant professionals in deterring 
majority shareholders’ oppressive behaviors, given the prohibition of class-
action lawsuits in the Chinese mainland. 
Moreover, the disciplinary forces from various market participants make 
expropriation and other malpractices more costly and less attractive to major 
shareholders (Shleifer and Wolfenzon, 2002). Chen and Steiner (2000) find that 
managerial ownership and analyst coverage are substituted in the U.S. firm 
monitoring. By alleviating the interest conflicts between large shareholders and 
external investors, a well-functioning financial market mitigates the adverse 
effect associated concentrated ownership. Relatedly, financial market 
monitoring can be thought of as directly limiting the scope for managerial 
extraction and hence making large shareholder monitoring less needed (La 
Rocca and Montalto, 2013). 
A relatively developed financial market, as an external governance mechanism, 
can arguably mitigate the expropriation risk for public investors and thus 
generate a positive effect on firm value. Specifically, by reducing the 
expropriation and monitoring incentives of majority shareholders, regional 
financial development may weaken the relationship between blockholder 
ownership and firm value, implying a substitution effect between financial 
development and concentrated ownership. 
4. Data and Variables 
The sample represents the nonfinancial companies listed on Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges for the period between 2005 and 2009. It consists of 
6078 province-firm-year observations, including 896 companies in 2005, 958 in 
2006, 1279 in 2007, 1381 in 2008, and 1564 in 2009.The firm-level financial 
and ownership variables are mainly drawn from Thomson DataStream and the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR). 
The ultimate corporate controllers are identified by tracing the ownership chains 
derived from multiple information sources, including the annual reports and the 
ownership transfer notices issued by the stock exchanges during the observation 
period. Firms are assigned to the provinces or municipalities based on the 
locations where they are officially registered. The firm-level data set is then 
merged with the provincial-level institutional indices retrieved from the latest 
Marketization Index for China’s Provinces (MICP). 
Tobin’s Q measures firm value, which is calculated as the market value of a 
firm’s equities and liabilities relative to their replacement costs (Lozano et al., 
2016). For Durnev and Kim (2005), firm value is an increasing function of the 
quality of a firm’s current projects and anticipated investments within the 
existing CG structure and institutional environment. Using Tobin’s Q 
complements the notion that investors favor or disfavor certain firms given the 
perceived investment risk and institutional quality, and that this will be reflected 
by particular Q values (Shan and McIver, 2011). Additionally, an illiquidity 
discount of 70% based on 364 Chinese private transfers of non-tradable shares 
is applied to the equity market value to derive adjusted Tobin’s Q (Q_70DIS) 
(Firth e al., 2008). A firm’s discounted equity market value is the sum of the 
number of its tradable shares multiplied by the share price and the number of its 
non-tradable shares by the 30 per cent of the share price. Both the unadjusted 
and illiquidity-adjusted Qs are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to 
mitigate outlier bias. 
CTL_CTRL is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if the listed company is 
ultimately controlled by the central government and zero otherwise. Likewise, 
LCL_CTRL takes the value of one when a local government is the ultimate 
corporate controller and zero otherwise. Companies controlled by private 
individuals or families are the reference group. As in Wright et al. (2007), 
ownership concentration (O_CNT) is measured by the cumulative shareholdings 
of blockholders owning at least 5% of a firm’s outstanding equity with the 
quadratic term (O_CNT2) detecting the possible nonlinear correlation. 
The primary indicator for provincial government quality (GOV_Q) is proxied by 
the MICP index of non-state sector development. The index itself is a weighted 
average of three sub-indexes for the non-state sector’s shares in provincial 
industrial output, fixed-asset investment, and urban employment.  As noted 
earlier, the relative size of a non-state sector indicates the degree of 
marketization and accordingly the policy orientation within the corresponding 
jurisdiction. 
The MICP index of provincial financial competition captures the progress of 
regional financial development (FIN_DEV). Allen et al. (2005) find that 
financial intermediation in China is largely bank-based and dominated by the 
state-owned financial institutions. The index is based on the deposits held by the 
non-state financial institutions as a proportion of the provincial total. The 
financial institutions herein include the commercial banks, credit cooperatives, 
insurance companies, asset management companies, securities companies and 
trust investment companies that are not government-affiliated. A more 
commercialized financial market, as indicated by a higher index value, can 
arguably impose stronger oversights over large shareholders and management. 
To isolate the effects of the ownership and institutional variables, other firm-
specific CG characteristics affect firm valuation are also controlled. These 
include board size (BD_SZ), board independence (BD_I), and director 
shareholding (DIR_SHR). The number of functional board committees 
(CMTE_NUM) is included given their important roles in monitoring and 
professionalizing major corporate decisions such as strategy evaluation, 
financial auditing, remuneration setting, and executive nomination (Xie et al., 
2003). Vafeas (1999) finds that investors devalue firms with more active boards 
for increased board activities signal poor performance or controversial decision-
making. Director activeness (DIR_ACT) is proxied by the frequency of board 
meetings (Marchionne and Niccoli, 2012). Similarly, the frequency of 
supervisory board meetings measures supervisor activeness (SUPV_ACT). 
Following Klapper and Love (2004), a dummy variable of cross-listing (CRS_L) 
is set to one if the firm has shares traded in an advanced stock market. Since 
disclosure standards and investor protection in the advanced economies are 
much higher than in the Chinese mainland, firms cross-listed in overseas stock 
exchanges, such as Hong Kong and New York, are expected to benefit from 
lower informational asymmetry and higher valuation (Hope and Thomas, 2008). 
Other control variables include firm size (F_SZ), return on sales (ROS), debt to 
equity ratio (DE_R), and a 2-digit SIC industry dummies (IND). The ratio of 
fixed assets to total assets measures asset tangibility (ATAG) for firms with 
higher asset tangibility tend to operate in more traditional industries where 
growth opportunities are relatively limited (Tian and Estrin, 2008).  
A crisis period dummy (CRS) that takes on the value of one in 2008 and zero 
otherwise is used to control for the likely adverse effect on firm value. A fiscal 
stimulus dummy (STIM) for 2009 is also created to capture the potential effects 
of the $586 billion stimulus package unveiled by the Chinese State Council in 
late 2008. Finally, the regional economic disparity is proxied by the natural 
logarithm of provincial GDP (PROV_GDP) (Ferreira and Laux, 2007). Table 1 
provides the variable definitions. 
Insert Table 1 here. 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics. Panel A shows that the illiquidity 
discount lowers the average Tobin’s Q from 2.59 to 1.98, which was 
comparable with those in other major stock exchanges. Between 2007 and 2008 
the unadjusted Q decreased by 1.95 (or approximately 52%) on average, 
reflecting the severe value declines among Chinese listed firms during the 
financial crisis. This was followed by a recovery of 1.45 or around 79% in 2009, 
which could be interpreted as a result of the fiscal stimulus undertaken by the 
Chinese State Council. Along with the expanded BD_SZ, BD_I increased 
moderately from 35% in 2005 to 37% in 2009. CMTE_NUM averaged around 4, 
and the average DIR_SHR equaled around 3%. As with DIR_ACT, the average 
frequency of supervisory board meetings increased from 3.24 in 2005 to 4.75 in 
2009, indicating the increased involvement of supervisors in CG over the 
observation period. Meanwhile, the sample companies are featured by highly 
concentrated ownership, as the blockholders typically controlled 47% of total 
shares outstanding. While unreported, O_CNT remained robustly stable across 
different control natures, about 49% for CSOEs, 47% for the LSOEs, and 46% 
for the private firms. 
In Panel B, only a small proportion of Chinese listed firms conformed to the 
higher-quality accounting standards, as the firms cross-listed in the advanced 
capital markets accounted for 2.99% of the entire sample. SOEs constituted the 
majority of the entire sample (64%), most of which, around 74%, were in fact 
controlled by the provincial and municipal governments through local state 
asset administration agencies or shareholding companies. As expected, the 
institutional indicators of GOV_Q and FIN_DEV exhibited significant regional 
variation. Higher GOV_Q and FIN_DEV were primarily found in economically 
more developed provinces such as Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang, despite 
the significant improvement of some interior regions. 
Insert Table 2 here. 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix. Most of the correlations are less than 
0.5 and variance inflation factors (VIFs) are within an acceptable range (mean 
1.44). Thus, there is no evidence of serious multicollinearity problem being 
present in the regression models. 
Insert Table 3 here. 
5. Regression Results and Analysis 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 4 reports the univariate comparisons of firm value between different 
subsamples. In Panel A, Tobin’s Q differs across different corporate control 
natures. The mean Q and Q_70DIS values of LOSEs are significantly lower 
than those of CSOEs, providing preliminary evidence of the contrasting effects 
between the central and local governments as corporate controllers. The entire 
sample is also divided based on whether the ownership concentration degree is 
above or below the median. The mean Q_70DIS for firms with higher (upper 
quantile) O_CNT is 1.796 compared to 2.155 for firms with lower O_CNT 
(below the lower quantile). The difference of -0.359 is significant at the 0.01 
level, indicating the adverse expropriation effect of concentrated ownership. 
Insert Table 4 here. 
Both provincial government quality and financial development are found to be 
positively correlated with firm value. The Q and Q_70DIS average at 2.673 and 
2.015 respectively for the firms in provinces with higher (upper quantile) 
GOV_Q, which are significantly higher than the corresponding values for the 
firms in provinces with lower (lower quantile) GOV_Q. In other words, public 
investors assign a higher valuation to the firm from a more market-driven policy 
environment. Similarly, there are significant differences in the mean Q and 
Q_70DIS values between firms in provinces with higher (upper quantile) and 
lower (lower quantile) FIN_DEV. For example, the mean Q_70DIS is 2.052 for 
firms in the financially more developed regions compared to 1.903 for those in 
financially less developed, implying a positive correlation between financial 
development and firm value. Panel B reports the similar results from median 
comparisons. While consistent with the earlier expectation, these preliminary 
findings should be interpreted cautiously as many other firm-specific and 
macroeconomic factors are not included. 
5.2 Model Specification 
A fixed-effects (FE) model can alleviate the endogeneity issues by eliminating 
particular time-invariant, firm-specific unobservable that affects both firm 
performance and explanatory variables (Wintoki et al., 2012). However, an FE 
model only gives the “within-groups” effect estimates to time-varying variables, 
and so an insignificant coefficient of an almost time-invariant variable could be 
taken as saying that there is no evidence for such an effect (Green, 2011: 194). 
This may give misleading answers to our research questions given that 
corporate control nature is almost time constant. 
Following Wooldrige (2015), this study employs a random-effects model 
augmented with the Mundlak (1978) correction, also referred to as a correlated 
random-effects approach (CRE). To modify the restrictive assumption that 
unobserved heterogeneity is random and particularly uncorrelated with the 
explanatory variables, a CRE model incorporates the averages of all firm-level 
time-varying variables to control for the correlation between the error term and 
corresponding covariates (Bell and Jones, 2015). It estimates the valuation 
effects of all time-varying characteristics net of unobserved heterogeneity while 
keeping time constant information. In detail, firm value is estimated by: 
𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝑝 = α + β1𝐶𝑇𝐿_𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖
𝑝 + β2𝐿𝐶𝐿_𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖
𝑝 + β3𝑂_𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑝 + β4𝑂_𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑝2 + β5𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝑄𝑡
𝑝
+ β6𝐹𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑝 + β7𝐶𝑇𝐿_𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖
𝑝 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝑄𝑡
𝑝 + β8𝐿𝐶𝐿_𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖
𝑝 ∗ 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝑄𝑡
𝑝
+ β9𝑂_𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑝 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑝 + β10𝑂_𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑝2 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐸𝑉𝑡
𝑝 + δ𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑝
+ θ𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑝 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑝 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 
where p denotes provinces or municipalities; i, firms; t, years; 𝛽0, the intercept; 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑝
, a vector of all the CG and financial control variables; and 
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 a vector of the averages of all endogenous, firm-specific, time-
varying variables. The unadjusted and adjusted 𝑄𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 values are tested separately 
on the independent variables. The institutional variable of 𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝑄𝑡
𝑝
 multiplies 
𝐶𝑇𝐿_𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖
𝑝
 and 𝐿𝐶𝐿_𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐿𝑖
𝑝
 respectively to capture the interaction effects. 
Similarly, 𝐹𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑡
𝑝
interacts with 𝑂_𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑝
 and its quadratic term 
respectively. Finally, the composite error term consists of a time-constant 
unobservable,  𝜀𝑖
𝑝
 and the idiosyncratic shocks, 𝜇𝑖𝑡
𝑝
. Both are assumed to be 
normally distributed. 
5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
Columns 1 of Table 5 represents the baseline estimation that includes only the 
financial and CG control variables. Consistent with Nguyen et al. (2016), 
BD_SZ is negatively related to firm value, as a larger board typically incurs 
higher coordinating cost and entrenchment risk. The significantly positive 
coefficient on CRS_L indicates the valuation premium for cross-listed firms 
given the higher accounting standards and corporate transparency. As with 
DIR_ACT, SUPV_ACT is positively related to firm value, suggesting that 
increased supervisory board activities improve monitoring and decision making. 
Insert Table 5 here. 
In Column 2, CTL_CTRL is significantly positively related to Tobin’s Q 
(β1=0.210, p<0.05), whilst the coefficient for LCL_CTRL is highly significant 
and with the expected negative sign (β2=-0.289, p<0.01). This implies that 
CSOEs generally enjoy higher valuation by approximately 22% than their local 
peers. The valuation gains can be attributed to the vast resource base and strong 
monitoring capabilities processed by the central government agencies (Chen et 
al., 2009). Column 3 detects a significant negative coefficient on O_CNT (β3=-
6.613, p<0.01), and a significantly positive coefficient on the quadratic term 
O_CNT2 (β4=-4.148, p<0.01). The signs and magnitudes of the coefficients 
indicate a nonlinear correlation between firm value and blockholder ownership. 
Columns 4 to 6 reestimate the above regressions using Q_70DIS as an 
alternative firm value proxy and recover qualitatively the same results. 
Table 6 extends the above regressions by including the institutional variables of 
𝐺𝑂𝑉_𝑄 and 𝐹𝐼𝑁_𝐷𝐸𝑉. Results of the control variables are largely maintained. 
In Column 1 of Table 6, GOV_Q is significantly and positively associated with 
the firm value (β5=0.142, p<0.0.1). Ceteris paribus, an improvement of one 
standard deviation in GOV_Q (2.669) raises Tobin’s Q by 0.379, an almost 15% 
increase relative to the sample average. The effect is economically significant 
and lends quantitative support to Edin (2005), who posits a positive connection 
between quality of policy environment and investor confidence. FIN_DEV is 
significantly positively related to firm value (β6=0.113, p<0.01). The coefficient 
magnitude suggests that the same increase in regional financial development 
(2.284) would raise the firm value by 0.258 or almost 10% relative to the 
sample average. This finding supports the conjecture that a more developed 
financial market helps safeguard minority investors’ interests, thus exerting a 
positive effect on firm valuation (Huyghebaert and Wang, 2012). 
Insert Table 6 here. 
As shown, the earlier findings on corporate control nature and ownership 
concentration are robust to the inclusion of the institutional variables. The 
coefficients for O_CNT and O_CNT2 retain the same signs and significance 
(β3=-6.022, p<0.01; β4=4.023, p<0.01), confirming the U-shaped relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm value. However, the inflection point 
occurs at around 75%, which far exceeds the average blockholder ownership 
observed in the full sample. Thus we cannot reject the graphic impression that 
the concentration-value relationship is virtually negative for Chinese listed 
companies. A plausible explanation is that the monitoring effect becomes 
dominant only if the equity stakes and incentives of large shareholders are 
sufficiently large (Daily et al., 2003). 
Column 7 of Table 6 examines the moderating effect of GOV_Q on the control-
value relationships. The coefficient on GOV_Q*CTL_CTRL is positive and 
significant at the 0.01 level (β7=0.165), indicating that investors additionally 
value CSOEs operating in policy environments that are benign and less 
interventionist. The result is consistent with the argument that formalized CG 
and increased competitive pressure promote market orientation among CSOEs 
cadres and thereby lead to better organizational performance (Li, 2014). As 
expected, the interaction between GOV_Q and LCL_CTRL enters significantly 
positive, supporting the conjecture that a pro-growth policy environment, as 
implied by a more prosperous non-state sector, attenuates the adverse effects of 
local government control and contributes to higher LSOE value. Specifically, 
one standard deviation improvement in the GOV_Q (2.669) raises the LSOE 
value by 0.571, a 25% increase relative to the average Q ratio of 2.25 for the 
sample LOSEs. In provinces with a more prosperous non-state sector such as 
Guangdong (the 5-year average GOV_Q =10.478), local government control 
(LCL_CTRL=1) even increases Tobin’s Q by 0.62. The results echo Jin et al. 
(2005) who document that the competitive pressure disciplines local 
governments to adopt better CG practices and to function as a ‘helping hand’ 
rather than a ‘grabbing hand’. Therefore, the moderating effect of government 
quality is not only statistically significant but also economically meaningful. 
To examine the substitution effect between financial development and 
concentrated ownership, Column 3 of Table 6 enters the interaction terms of 
FIN_DEV with O_CNT and O_CNT2. The coefficient on the interaction with 
O_CNT2 suggests the significant mediating effect of financial development on 
the concentration-value relationship (β10=-0.968, p=0.01). To probe this finding, 
we plot the results in Figure 1. Following Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010), all 
variables, except FIN_DEV, O_CNT, and O_CNT2, are constrained to the mean 
values. FIN_DREG takes the values at the 25th and 75th percentiles. 
Figure 1 illustrates that at lower levels of concentration, the negative 
expropriation effect on Tobin’s Q declines less steeply for the firms in 
financially more developed jurisdictions. It supports the conjecture that a well-
functioning financial market reduces the inclination of blockholders to engage 
in expropriatory activities and thus mitigates the adverse effects associated with 
concentrated ownership. Likewise, at higher levels of ownership concentration, 
the positive effects of large shareholder monitoring on Tobin’s Q also rises less 
steeply for firms in financially more developed regions. In brief, the marginal 
impact of ownership concentration on firm value decreases with regional 
financial development. This can be interpreted as evidence that the disciplining 
mechanism of financial markets partially substitutes the monitoring function 
performed by major shareholders. 
Although unshown, the effect of FIN_DEV is qualitatively unchanged by using 
the Herfindahl index of top 10 shareholdings as an alternative concentration 
proxy. The findings remain consistent when the dependent variable is changed 
to Q_70DIS. Meanwhile, the addition of the institutional variables markedly 
increases the models’ explanatory power: the adjusted R2 increases substantially 
to 0.401 in Column 3 of Table 6 as compared to 0.34 in Column 1 of Table 5. 
All hypotheses are supported by the empirical results. 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
6. Robustness 
A common critique of the ownership-value relationship is that firm value is a 
determinant of ownership characteristics and should be treated as an 
endogenous variable instead (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). However, the 
validity of the reverse causality argument critically relies on the liquidity and 
informational efficiency of the underlying stock market. 
In China, the transfers and liquidation of state shares are strictly scrutinized and 
restricted by the national and provincial state assets administrative apparatus. 
Given the highly regulated nature of state asset transactions, the identities of 
corporate controllers are relatively stable and unaffected by firm value 
fluctuation, suggesting that CTL_CTRL and LCL_CTRL can be treated as the 
exogenous variables. 
To address the simultaneous causality between O_CNT and Tobin’s Q, the first 
robustness test uses the percentage of shareholdings present at the annual 
general meeting (AGM) (PCT_SHR_AGM) as an instrumental variable (IV). 
This can be justified by the following consideration. First, major shareholders 
have strong incentives to engage in CG through exercising their formal voting 
rights in AGMs, and particularly so given the considerable exit costs incurred 
by the poor liquidity of the mainland stock markets (Bhide, 1993). Therefore, 
the shareholdings present at the AGM should be highly correlated with the 
aggregate equity holdings held by large shareholders. Second, PCT_SHR_AGM 
is not highly correlated with firm value. Tam (2002) finds that in China 
minority investors exhibit a highly speculative tendency with very short 
investment horizon. The relative inactivity of minority shareholders suggests 
that PCT_SHR_AGM may remain rather stable regardless of changes in firm 
performance. Finally, the correlation between Tobin’s Q and PCT_SHR_AGM 
is -0.018, while the correlation between O_CNT and PCT_SHR_AGM is 0.79, 
suggesting that PCT_SHR_AGM be an appropriate instrument. 
In the first stage of the IV regression, O_CNT is regressed on PCT_SHR_AGM. 
The predicted value of O_CNT (O_CNT _IV) is then used as the ownership 
concentration proxy in the second stage regression. Meanwhile, an alternative 
illiquidity discount of 90% based 2090 public auctions of Chinese restricted 
shares is to Tobin’s Q (Q_90DIS) as public auction represents a more market-
driven and efficient pricing mechanism compared with private transfers (Hou 
and Howell, 2012). 
Table 7 reports the results. The contrasting effects of CTL_CTRL and 
LCL_CTRL on Tobin’s Q, as well as their interactions with GOV_Q, remained 
qualitatively unchanged. They contrast with previous findings that state 
ownership is uniformly harmful to firm value (e.g. Bai et al., 2004; Wei et al., 
2005). Such differences are due to this study’s focus on the actual identities of 
corporate controllers rather than the legal classification of shares. 
Insert Table 7 here. 
In Columns 5 and 6, the negative interactions between FIN_DEV and O_CNT 
_IV2 are largely maintained despite the minor decreases in significance and 
magnitude. In other words, the potential simultaneity cannot explain away the 
mediating effect of regional financial development on the concentration-value 
relationship. Unreported tests also obtain similar results, when the lagged value 
of O_CNT is applied as the alternative instrument as in Maury and Pajuste 
(2005). Results using IV regressions generally confirm the previous findings. 
The second robustness test retrieves the MICP index of enterprise nontax 
burden reduction as a more direct measurement of government quality, denoted 
as NTX_RED. For La Porta et al. (1999), entrusting officials with greater power 
of extracting non-tax revenues invites corruption and predation. The political 
economy literature on China’s enterprise reform suggests that under the 
decentralized fiscal structure, the provincial and municipal governments often 
impose considerable nontax fiscal burdens on local businesses via their patron-
client networks in order to fulfill their social and other non-economic functions 
(Ko and Zhi, 2013). A higher value for the index is associated with less 
bureaucratic intervention and more growth-oriented policies within the 
corresponding jurisdiction.  
Meanwhile, there may also exist a substitution effect between legal quality and 
ownership concertation as argued by legal economists (e.g. Durnev and Kim, 
2005; Filatotchev et al., 2008). For this reason, FIN_DEV is replaced with the 
MICP index of legal quality (LGL_Q) as an alternative proxy for the strength of 
external oversight. The index represents a weighted average of six sub-indices 
related to different aspects of legal protection including legal intermediary 
development, contract enforcement, and property right protection.  
Table 8 reports the results of these alternative institutional indicators. The 
positive relationship between NTX_RED and Tobin’s Q is economically 
important and statistically significant as with GOV_Q. The sign and 
significance of the LEG_QUA coefficient suggest that firms in provinces with 
stronger legal protection are significantly valued higher. However, the 
coefficient magnitude is much smaller compared to that of FIN_DEV. This 
should be interpreted as evidence of the limited protection by Chinese legal 
institutions due to the absence of judicial independence (Clarke, 2010). Similar 
results are obtained when Q_90DIS is applied (Models 4 to 6). 
Insert Table 8 here. 
In Columns 3 and 6, the interactions of NTX_RED with CTRL_CTROL and 
LCL_CTROL enter statistically significantly positive, reaffirming the 
importance of local political and economic institutions in shaping the incentives 
and behaviors of the government officials. Furthermore, the interaction terms 
between LGL_Q and O_CNT2 is significantly positive at the 0.01 level 
(β10=0.358 in Column 3 and 0.261 in Column 6 respectively). Figure 2 
graphically presents the results following the earlier approach. The less steep, 
downward-sloping solid curve suggests that genuine legal quality (75th 
percentile) may mitigate the negative expropriation effect at lower levels of 
ownership concentration. However, as CON_CNT increases, such a negative 
effect levels off and the expected positive effect of large shareholder monitoring 
remain either trivial or non-existent. Heugens et al. (2009) argue that stronger 
legal protection renders large shareholder monitoring redundant. Taken together, 
the association between concentrated ownership and firm value proves to be 
weaker in the presence of effective external CG mechanisms including regional 
financial market and legal protection. The robustness test results are largely 
consistent with the earlier findings 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines empirically the impacts on Chinese firm value of particular 
ownership characteristics and the relevant institutional factors of government 
quality and financial development. Several revealing findings emerge. Firstly, 
the positive role of central government corporate controllers contrasts 
significantly with that of their local peers, showing the divergent policy 
imperatives and monitoring capacities under fiscal and administrative 
decentralization. This challenges the commonly-held view of one monolithic 
state uniformly presiding over Chinese corporate governance. Secondly, it 
confirms a U-shaped effect of ownership concentration on firm value using 
alternative concentration measures. However, it is only at very high levels of 
concentration that a positive impact on firm valuation is observed, suggesting 
that the potential expropriation risk remains a major investor concern. Thirdly, 
the value implication of provincial-level government quality is statistically and 
economically significant. A pro-growth policy environment enhances the 
positive relationship between central government control and firm value while 
alleviating the deleterious effect associated with local government control. 
These findings indicate that there are gains to be obtained by altering the 
incentives structure of SOE cadres without large-scale privatization. Finally, the 
effect of ownership concentration on firm value is reduced by regional financial 
development, as well as is the case of regional legal quality. This is because the 
disciplining function of a well-functioning financial market mitigates both the 
expropriation and monitoring incentives of large shareholders. Extending the 
legal finance literature, these results shed light on the institutional 
embeddedness of Chinese corporate governance. 
For many emerging economies, an acceptance of the primacy of legal investor 
protection is unlikely to simply materialize under the present political and 
economic institutions. As heavy government intervention continues, reform 
initiatives should also be directed towards limiting bureaucratic predation and 
cultivating a more growth-oriented policy environment that is advantageous to 
both public and private enterprises. Accordingly, more research is needed to 
understand the incentives of a government in its relationship with firms under 
its jurisdiction. This entails an analysis of the political system and an 
understanding of how bureaucrats are compensated and promoted, how 
politicians are selected into power, and how misconduct is detected and 
punished. In addition to capital raising and risk sharing, competition in 
financials helps safeguard investors’ interests and prevent CG problems. Firms 
subject to the scrutinization and monitoring of market participants must adjust 
their operations and management to maximize value added. To this extent, 
financial deregulation can have a powerful role in guiding firms towards good 
governance practices. Further research should take into account other factor 
markets, including labor, raw material, and distribution services, and in 
particular their interactions with particular firm-level CG mechanisms. 
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Figure 1 Moderating Effect of Financial Development on the Concentration-Value Relationship 
 
Figure 2 Moderating Effect of Legal Environment on the Concentration-Value Relationship 
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Table 1 Variable Definition 
Variable Specification 
Q Tobin’s Q, calculated as the ratio of the sum of equity market value and liability book value over the 
total asset book value: 
 equity market value +  book vakue of total liabilities
replacement cost of total assets
 
Q_70DIS Tobin’s Q after 70 percent illiquidity discount, defined as the ratio of the sum of the adjusted equity 
market value and liability book value over total asset book value. It is calculated as: 
 discounted  equity  market value + book value of total liabilities
replacement cost of total assets
 
where discounted  equity  market value = number of tradable shares * share price + number of non-
tradable shares * share price * 30%. 
F_SZ Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. 
DE_R Debt to equity ratio. 
ROS_R Return on sales. 
AT Asset tangibility, defined as the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets. 
CRS Crisis dummy that equals to one for 2008 and zero otherwise. 
STIM Stimulus dummy that equals to one for 2009 and zero otherwise. 
PROV_GDP Natural logarithm of provincial GDP for the corresponding year. 
IND Dummy variables equal to one for each of the two-digit SIC categories and zero otherwise. 
BD_SZ Board size, defined as the total number of directors on a board. 
BD_I Board independence, defined as the proportion of non-executive directors on a board. 
CMTE_NUM Number of functional committees under the board. 
DIR_SHR Aggregate shareholdings held by directors. 
DIR_ACT Director activities, defined as the number of board meetings during the corresponding fiscal year. 
SUPV_ACT Supervisor activities, defined as the number of supervisory board meetings during the corresponding 
fiscal year. 
CRS_L Cross listing dummy that equals to one if the firm has shares traded in an advanced stock market and 
zero otherwise. 
CTL_CTRL Central control dummy that equals to one if the firm is ultimately controlled by the central 
government. 
LCL_CTRL Local control dummy that equals to one if the firm is ultimately controlled by a provincial or 
municipal government. 
O_CNT Ownership concentration, calculated as the aggregate shareholding held by investors who own 5 
percent or more of a firm’s outstanding equity. 
GOV_Q The MICP index of non-state sector development, using the weighted average of the proportional 
contributions of the non-state enterprises to provincial industrial output, fixed asset investment, and 
urban employment. 
FIN_DEV The MICP index of financial development based on the percentage of deposits at non-state financial 
institutions in total provincial deposits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Firm Value, Corporate Governance and Institutional Variables 
Panel A: Non-Dummy Variables 
Year Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
2005 Q 896 1.432 0.577 0.808 3.995 
Q_70DIS 896 1.095 0.630 0.698 10.184 
BD_SZ 896 9.648 2.045 5 19 
BD_I 896 0.348 0.046 0.083 0.600 
CMTE_NUM 896 3.046 1.550 0 6 
DIR_SHR 896 0.010 0.061 0.000 0.634 
DIR_ACT 896 7.608 3.205 2 32 
SUPV_ACT 896 3.238 1.655 1 16 
O_CNT 896 0.524 0.138 0.000 0.931 
GOV_Q 896 7.282 2.226 0.090 9.940 
FIN_DEV 896 6.909 2.476 -3.980 10.240 
2006 Q 958 1.942 1.141 0.904 7.600 
Q_70DIS 958 1.452 0.888 0.698 10.184 
BD_SZ 958 9.458 2.000 4 19 
BD_I 958 0.353 0.046 0.111 0.571 
CMTE_NUM 958 3.294 1.378 0 7 
DIR_SHR 958 0.016 0.073 0.000 0.656 
DIR_ACT 958 8.204 3.533 2 33 
SUPV_ACT 958 4.100 1.598 1 13 
O_CNT 958 0.462 0.142 0.000 0.926 
GOV_Q 958 9.346 2.638 2.800 12.770 
FIN_DEV 958 7.268 2.248 -2.460 10.200 
2007 Q 1279 3.846 2.504 1.379 15.928 
Q_70DIS 1279 2.722 1.586 0.986 10.184 
BD_SZ 1279 9.324 1.940 3 18 
BD_I 1279 0.359 0.048 0.143 0.667 
CMTE_NUM 1279 3.661 0.958 0 8 
DIR_SHR 1279 0.026 0.098 0.000 0.729 
DIR_ACT 1279 9.799 3.573 2 36 
SUPV_ACT 1279 4.568 1.663 1 15 
O_CNT 1279 0.457 0.162 0.000 0.911 
GOV_Q 1279 9.901 2.560 3.120 13.440 
FIN_DEV 1279 8.105 2.200 -2.780 11.010 
2008 Q 1381 1.835 1.085 0.893 8.040 
Q_70DIS 1381 1.472 0.992 0.698 10.184 
BD_SZ 1381 9.197 1.889 4 18 
BD_I 1381 0.362 0.053 0.143 0.667 
CMTE_NUM 1381 3.860 0.590 0 8 
DIR_SHR 1381 0.039 0.123 0.000 0.730 
DIR_ACT 1381 9.681 3.468 3 36 
SUPV_ACT 1381 4.954 1.586 1 16 
O_CNT 1381 0.463 0.160 0.000 0.896 
GOV_Q 1381 10.076 2.467 3.440 13.730 
FIN_DREG 1381 8.312 2.100 -2.310 11.020 
2009 Q 1564 3.289 2.086 1.184 14.141 
Q_70DIS 1564 2.635 1.585 0.842 10.184 
BD_SZ 1564 9.090 1.868 4 18 
BD_I 1564 0.365 0.052 0.091 0.714 
CMTE_NUM 1564 3.850 0.538 0 7 
DIR_SHR 1564 0.049 0.138 0.000 0.730 
DIR_ACT 1564 8.478 3.685 1 34 
SUPV_ACT 1564 4.748 1.603 0 16 
O_CNT 1564 0.456 0.164 0.000 0.903 
GOV_Q 1564 10.070 2.505 3.360 13.630 
FIN_DEV 1564 8.578 2.098 -1.870 12.100 
All Q 6078 2.590 1.952 0.808 15.928 
Q_70DIS 6078 1.976 1.423 0.698 10.184 
BD_SZ 6078 9.304 1.944 3 19 
BD_I 6078 0.359 0.050 0.083 0.714 
CMTE_NUM 6078 3.606 1.045 0 8 
DIR_SHR 6078 0.031 0.109 0.000 0.730 
DIR_ACT 6078 8.858 3.614 1 36 
Continued on next page 
 Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Firm Value, Corporate Governance and Institutional Variables (continued) 
Panel A: Non-Dummy Variables 
Year Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
All SUPV_ACT 6078 4.432 1.714 0 16 
O_CNT 6078 0.469 0.157 0.000 0.931 
GOV_Q 6078 9.511 2.669 0.090 13.730 
FIN_DEV 6078 7.966 2.284 -3.980 12.100 
Panel B: Dummy Variables 
Year Variable N Frequency Percentage 
2005 CRS_L 896 28 3.13 
CTL_CTRL 896 157 17.52 
LCL_CTRL 896 483 53.91 
2006 CRS_L 958 27 2.82 
CTL_CTRL 958 156 16.28 
LCL_CTRL 958 497 51.88 
2007 CRS_L 1279 39 3.05 
CTL_CTRL 1279 219 17.12 
LCL_CTRL 1279 597 46.68 
2008 CRS_L 1381 43 3.11 
CTL_CTRL 1381 226 16.36 
LCL_CTRL 1381 616 44.61 
2009 CRS_L 1564 45 2.88 
CTL_CTRL 1564 260 16.62 
LCL_CTRL 1564 660 42.20 
All CRS_L 6078 182 2.99 
CTL_CTRL 6078 1018 16.75 
LCL_CTRL 6078 2853 46.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Correlation Matrix  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Q 1 
                  
 
2 F_SZ -0.364 1 
                 
 
3 DE_R -0.239 0.250 1 
                
 
4 ROS_R 0.231 -0.037 -0.166 1 
               
 
5 AT -0.145 0.167 0.141 -0.058 1 
              
 
6 CRS -0.210 0.019 -0.003 -0.004 -0.019 1 
             
 
7 STIM 0.211 0.067 -0.024 0.041 -0.080 -0.319 1 
            
 
8 PROV_GDP 0.045 0.078 -0.040 -0.029 -0.101 0.104 0.216 1 
           
 
9 BD_SZ -0.135 0.305 0.105 0.005 0.165 -0.030 -0.065 -0.045 1 
          
 
10 BD_I 0.063 0.009 -0.017 -0.028 -0.050 0.038 0.071 0.059 -0.265 1 
         
 
11 CMTE_NUM 0.049 0.023 0.024 -0.006 -0.035 0.132 0.137 0.084 0.032 0.052 1  
12 DIR_SHR 0.140 -0.154 -0.093 0.118 -0.125 0.039 0.099 0.175 -0.115 0.060 0.031 1 
       
 
13 DIR_ACT -0.024 0.174 0.087 0.004 -0.122 0.124 -0.062 0.047 -0.028 0.035 0.071 -0.041 1 
      
 
14 SUPV_ACT 0.052 0.078 -0.014 0.011 -0.038 0.165 0.109 0.117 -0.028 0.036 0.122 0.006 0.328 1 
     
 
15 CRS_L -0.061 0.330 0.022 0.004 0.110 0.004 -0.004 0.040 0.126 0.065 -0.001 -0.049 0.061 0.021 1 
    
 
16 CTL_CTRL -0.018 0.202 0.063 -0.073 0.016 -0.006 -0.002 -0.037 0.148 -0.018 -0.005 -0.119 -0.015 -0.034 0.172 1 
   
 
17 LCL_CTRL -0.168 0.142 0.045 -0.055 0.147 -0.025 -0.056 -0.082 0.116 -0.063 -0.006 -0.253 -0.024 -0.019 -0.009 -0.422 1 
  
 
18 O_CNT -0.003 0.121 -0.029 0.087 0.049 -0.021 -0.047 0.008 0.035 0.019 -0.084 0.139 -0.075 -0.046 0.082 0.069 -0.008 1 
 
 
19 GOV_Q 0.073 0.052 -0.022 -0.020 -0.143 0.115 0.123 0.779 -0.062 0.058 0.079 0.196 0.098 0.148 0.037 -0.051 -0.126 -0.012 1  
20 FIN_DEV 0.041 0.116 -0.015 -0.041 -0.134 0.082 0.158 0.633 -0.005 0.056 0.057 0.139 0.055 0.122 0.053 0.018 -0.040 -0.008 0.573 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4 Results from Univariate Tests  
Panel A: Mean Comparison 
 
 Q  Q_70DIS 
Obs. Mean Difference  Mean Difference 
CTL_CTRL 1018 2.510 
0.268*** 
 1.912 
0.151*** 
LCL_CTRL 2853 2.242  1.761 
 
PRI_CTRL 2207 3.076 
0.834*** 
 2.282 
0.521*** 
LCL_CTRL 2853 2.242  1.761 
 
PRI_CTRL 2207 3.076 
0.566*** 
 2.282 
0.370*** 
CTL_CTRL 1018 2.510  1.912 
 
Upper quantile of O_CON 3040 2.59 
0.004 
 1.796 
-0.359*** 
Lower quantile of O_CON 3038 2.588  2.155 
 
Upper quantile of GOV_Q 2958 2.673 
0.162*** 
 2.015 
0.076** 
Lower quantile of GOV_Q 3120 2.511  1.939 
 
Upper quantile of FIN_DEV 2971 2.678 
0.172*** 
 2.052 
0.149*** 
Lower quantile of FIN_DEV 3107 2.506  1.903 
Panel B: Median Comparison 
 
 Q  Q_70DIS 
Obs. Median Difference  Median Difference 
CTL_CTRL 1018 1.932 
0.187*** 
 1.478 
0.088*** 
LCL_CTRL 2853 1.745  1.390 
 
PRI_CTRL 2207 2.731 
0.986*** 
 1.782 
0.392*** 
LCL_CTRL 2853 1.745  1.390 
 
PRI_CTRL 2207 2.731 
0.799*** 
 1.782 
0.304*** 
CTL_CTRL 1018 1.932  1.478 
 
Upper quantile of O_CON 3040 1.984 
0.015 
 1.427 
-0.237*** 
Lower quantile of O_CON 3038 1.969  1.664 
 
Upper quantile of GOV_Q 2958 2.087 
0.212*** 
 1.629 
0.169*** 
Lower quantile of GOV_Q 3120 1.875  1.460 
 
Upper quantile of FIN_DEV 2971 2.092 
0.211*** 
 1.643 
0.187*** 
Lower quantile of FIN_DEV 3107 1.881  1.456 
Note: The mean and median comparisons use the unpaired T-test and the Wilconxon Z-test respectively. 
           * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 Tobin’s Q on Control Nature and Ownership Concentration 
 Q  Q_70DIS 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
F_SZ 
-1.095*** -1.088*** -0.986***  -0.914*** -0.909*** -0.806*** 
(0.057) (0.057) (0.058)  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
DE_R 
-0.073*** -0.075*** -0.076***  -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.053*** 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) 
ROS_R 
1.263*** 1.250*** 1.400***  0.567*** 0.560*** 0.724*** 
(0.269) (0.269) (0.266)  (0.197) (0.197) (0.193) 
AT 
-1.604*** -1.588*** -1.670***  -0.873*** -0.863*** -0.942*** 
(0.236) (0.236) (0.233)  (0.173) (0.173) (0.169) 
BD_SZ 
-0.041* -0.042* -0.031  -0.040** -0.041** -0.029* 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
BD_I 
1.994*** 1.982*** 1.867***  1.370*** 1.362*** 1.254*** 
(0.623) (0.622) (0.615)  (0.456) (0.455) (0.445) 
CMTE_NUM 
0.269*** 0.269*** 0.237***  0.201*** 0.201*** 0.167*** 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
DIR_SHR 
-2.594** -2.596** -2.026*  -3.287*** -3.288*** -2.686*** 
(1.068) (1.066) (1.055)  (0.781) (0.780) (0.764) 
DIR_ACT 
0.076*** 0.075*** 0.070***  0.054*** 0.053*** 0.048*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SUPV_ACT 
0.106*** 0.106*** 0.092***  0.084*** 0.084*** 0.068*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
CRS_L 
0.559*** 0.442** 0.415**  0.458*** 0.380*** 0.384*** 
(0.188) (0.188) (0.186)  (0.137) (0.137) (0.135) 
CTL_CTRL 
 
0.210** 0.204**  
 
0.151** 0.180*** 
 
(0.094) (0.094)  
 
(0.069) (0.068) 
LCL_CTRL 
 
-0.289*** -0.272***  
 
-0.177*** -0.149*** 
 
(0.070) (0.069)  
 
(0.051) (0.050) 
O_CNT 
  
-6.613***  
  
-5.714*** 
  
(1.020)  
  
(0.739) 
O_CNT2 
  
4.148***  
  
3.129*** 
  
(1.052)  
  
(0.762) 
Constant 
6.362*** 6.534*** 8.398***  6.015*** 6.140*** 7.174*** 
(1.190) (1.184) (1.210)  (0.867) (0.862) (0.879) 
CRS Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
STIM Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IND Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
PROV_GDP Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6078 6078 6078  6078 6078 6078 
Firms 1605 1605 1605  1605 1605 1605 
Within group R2 0.262 0.265 0.283  0.313 0.314 0.345 
Between group R2 0.437 0.444 0.458  0.342 0.349 0.370 
Overall R2 0.340 0.346 0.363  0.335 0.340 0.363 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
           * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6 Firm Value on Control Nature, Ownership Concentration and Institutional Indicators 
 Q  Q_70DIS 
 
(7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) (12) 
F_SZ 
-1.035*** -1.061*** -1.289***  -0.842*** -0.863*** -1.032*** 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.055)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) 
DE_R 
-0.072*** -0.072*** -0.039*  -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.025 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.024)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
ROS_R 
1.410*** 1.509*** 1.610***  0.732*** 0.805*** 0.877*** 
(0.259) (0.258) (0.248)  (0.188) (0.188) (0.179) 
AT 
-1.534*** -1.561*** -1.069***  -0.848*** -0.868*** -0.501*** 
(0.227) (0.226) (0.218)  (0.165) (0.164) (0.158) 
BD_SZ 
-0.029 -0.029 -0.012  -0.027* -0.027* -0.014 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) 
BD_I 
1.638*** 1.591*** 1.093*  1.102** 1.070** 0.703* 
(0.598) (0.596) (0.571)  (0.434) (0.433) (0.414) 
CMTE_NUM 
0.214*** 0.208*** 0.129***  0.150*** 0.146*** 0.087*** 
(0.026) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
DIR_SHR 
-2.205** -2.368** -3.441***  -2.803*** -2.922*** -3.700*** 
(1.025) (1.022) (0.981)  (0.744) (0.742) (0.711) 
DIR_ACT 
0.065*** 0.063*** 0.047***  0.045*** 0.044*** 0.032*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SUPV_ACT 
0.079*** 0.077*** 0.040***  0.059*** 0.057*** 0.030*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
CRS_L 
0.330* 0.318 0.344*  0.327** 0.308** 0.326** 
(0.195) (0.195) (0.187)  (0.141) (0.141) (0.135) 
CTL_CTRL (1) 
0.239** -0.552* -0.571*  0.201*** -0.476** -0.490** 
(0.097) (0.315) (0.302)  (0.070) (0.228) (0.218) 
LCL_CTRL (2) 
-0.240*** -0.832*** -0.625***  -0.127** -0.501*** -0.346** 
(0.072) (0.214) (0.206)  (0.052) (0.155) (0.148) 
O_CNT (3) 
-6.022*** -6.090*** -15.131***  -5.311*** -5.362*** -10.801*** 
(0.992) (0.990) (2.453)  (0.721) (0.719) (1.774) 
O_CNT2 (4) 
4.023*** 4.285*** 12.881***  3.039*** 3.225*** 8.344*** 
(1.022) (1.020) (2.652)  (0.742) (0.741) (1.919) 
GOV_Q (5) 
0.142*** 0.085*** 0.112***  0.089*** 0.048*** 0.069*** 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
FIN_DEV (6) 
0.113*** 0.118*** 0.483***  0.091*** 0.094*** 0.404*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.067)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.048) 
(1)*(5)  
0.165*** 0.115***  
 
0.124*** 0.087*** 
 
(0.036) (0.034)  
 
(0.026) (0.025) 
(2)*(5)  
0.129*** 0.074***  
 
0.091*** 0.050*** 
 
(0.025) (0.024)  
 
(0.018) (0.017) 
(3)*(6)   
1.376***  
  
0.863*** 
  
(0.289)  
  
(0.209) 
(4)*(6)   
-1.168***  
  
-0.710*** 
  
(0.317)  
  
(0.230) 
Constant 
19.928*** 19.080*** 14.641***  15.176*** 14.544*** 10.968*** 
(1.642) (1.654) (1.667)  (1.188) (1.195) (1.201) 
CRS Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
STIM Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IND Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
PROV_GDP Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6078 6078 6078  6078 6078 6078 
Firms 1605 1605 1605  1605 1605 1605 
Within Group R2 0.32 0.324 0.395  0.375 0.378 0.442 
Between Group R2 0.427 0.432 0.433  0.348 0.354 0.375 
Overall R2 0.358 0.363 0.401  0.359 0.365 0.409 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
           * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
 Table 7 Regression Results from Instrumental Variable Approach 
 Q  Q_90DIS 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
F_SZ 
-1.048*** -1.068*** -1.293***  -0.806*** -0.822*** -0.965*** 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.054)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) 
DE_R 
-0.069*** -0.070*** -0.037  -0.041** -0.041** -0.02 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
ROS_R 
1.377*** 1.465*** 1.542***  0.579*** 0.638*** 0.688*** 
(0.257) (0.257) (0.246)  (0.175) (0.175) (0.168) 
AT 
-1.354*** -1.383*** -0.944***  -0.585*** -0.606*** -0.313** 
(0.228) (0.227) (0.219)  (0.155) (0.155) (0.149) 
BD_SZ 
-0.025 -0.025 -0.011  -0.019 -0.019 -0.01 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
BD_I 
1.826*** 1.784*** 1.254**  1.121*** 1.095*** 0.748* 
(0.595) (0.594) (0.569)  (0.405) (0.404) (0.388) 
CMTE_NUM 
0.207*** 0.201*** 0.123***  0.130*** 0.127*** 0.075*** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
DIR_SHR 
-1.321 -1.476 -2.599**  -1.823** -1.925*** -2.625*** 
(1.062) (1.060) (1.016)  (0.722) (0.721) (0.694) 
DIR_ACT 
0.065*** 0.064*** 0.047***  0.041*** 0.040*** 0.029*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
SUPV_ACT 
0.080*** 0.078*** 0.041***  0.047*** 0.045*** 0.021** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
CRS_L 
0.165 0.157 0.199  0.323** 0.306** 0.333*** 
(0.197) (0.197) (0.189)  (0.133) (0.133) (0.128) 
CTL_CTRL (1) 
0.209** -0.512 -0.499*  0.145** -0.435** -0.432** 
(0.098) (0.315) (0.301)  (0.066) (0.213) (0.204) 
LCL_CTRL (2) 
-0.227*** -0.712*** -0.481**  -0.154*** -0.391*** -0.248* 
(0.072) (0.214) (0.206)  (0.049) (0.145) (0.140) 
O_CNT_IV (3) 
-8.032*** -7.856*** -13.786***  -4.693*** -4.573*** -8.792*** 
(1.286) (1.284) (3.615)  (0.874) (0.873) (2.460) 
O_CN_IV2 (4) 
4.782*** 4.786*** 10.741***  1.515* 1.510* 6.396** 
(1.312) (1.309) (4.008)  (0.892) (0.890) (2.729) 
GOV_Q (5) 
0.139*** 0.090*** 0.117***  0.079*** 0.049*** 0.067*** 
(0.016) (0.021) (0.020)  (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) 
FIN_DEV (6) 
0.114*** 0.118*** 0.554***  0.084*** 0.087*** 0.382*** 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.100)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.068) 
(1)*(5)  
0.154*** 0.100***  
 
0.103*** 0.068*** 
 
(0.035) (0.034)  
 
(0.024) (0.023) 
(2)*(5)  
0.109*** 0.055**  
 
0.068*** 0.033** 
 
(0.025) (0.024)  
 
(0.017) (0.016) 
(3)*(6)   
1.131***  
  
0.791*** 
  
(0.437)  
  
(0.297) 
(4)*(6)   
-0.917*  
  
-0.733** 
  
(0.487)  
  
(0.332) 
Constant 
20.392*** 19.613*** 14.670***  12.824*** 12.280*** 9.010*** 
(1.660) (1.674) (1.789)  (1.120) (1.129) (1.212) 
CRS Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
STIM Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IND Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
PROV_GDP Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5909 5909 5909  5909 5909 5909 
Firms 1543 1543 1543  1543 1543 1543 
Within Group R2 0.327 0.331 0.401  0.393 0.396 0.451 
Between Group R2 0.429 0.433 0.439  0.352 0.357 0.374 
Overall R2 0.362 0.366 0.406  0.367 0.372 0.411 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
           * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 8 Firm Value on Control Nature, Ownership Concentration and Alternative Institutional Indicators 
 Q  Q_90DIS 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
F_SZ 
-1.001*** -1.000*** -1.089***  -0.742*** -0.742*** -0.808*** 
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
DE_R 
-0.074*** -0.073*** -0.067***  -0.045*** -0.045*** -0.040** 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
ROS_R 
1.416*** 1.383*** 1.401***  0.565*** 0.553*** 0.563*** 
(0.265) (0.265) (0.262)  (0.178) (0.178) (0.176) 
AT 
-1.643*** -1.640*** -1.476***  -0.744*** -0.747*** -0.617*** 
(0.232) (0.232) (0.230)  (0.156) (0.156) (0.155) 
BD_SZ 
-0.029 -0.031 -0.023  -0.024 -0.025* -0.018 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
BD_I 
1.841*** 1.806*** 1.841***  1.164*** 1.151*** 1.188*** 
(0.611) (0.611) (0.604)  (0.411) (0.411) (0.405) 
CMTE_NUM 
0.228*** 0.230*** 0.205***  0.142*** 0.143*** 0.123*** 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) 
DIR_SHR 
-2.033* -1.921* -1.485  -2.800*** -2.747*** -2.373*** 
(1.050) (1.051) (1.041)  (0.706) (0.707) (0.698) 
DIR_ACT 
0.070*** 0.069*** 0.067***  0.043*** 0.043*** 0.041*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
SUPV_ACT 
0.090*** 0.090*** 0.079***  0.061*** 0.061*** 0.053*** 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
CRS_L 
0.398** 0.390** 0.430**  0.340*** 0.334*** 0.380*** 
(0.188) (0.188) (0.187)  (0.124) (0.125) (0.123) 
CTL_CTRL (1) 
0.180* -2.866** -3.997***  0.150** -1.128 -1.932** 
(0.094) (1.273) (1.266)  (0.063) (0.851) (0.843) 
LCL_CTRL (2) 
-0.264*** -2.062** -2.509***  -0.116** -0.943 -1.224** 
(0.070) (0.879) (0.873)  (0.046) (0.589) (0.583) 
O_CNT (3) 
-6.557*** -6.445*** -5.890***  -5.441*** -5.396*** -4.848*** 
(1.014) (1.013) (1.052)  (0.682) (0.682) (0.706) 
O_CNT (4) 
4.203*** 4.143*** 1.964*  2.912*** 2.884*** 1.395* 
(1.045) (1.044) (1.068)  (0.703) (0.703) (0.716) 
NTX_RED (5) 
0.151*** 0.079* 0.077*  0.090*** 0.056* 0.060** 
(0.032) (0.045) (0.045)  (0.021) (0.030) (0.030) 
LEG_Q (6) 
0.014* 0.012 0.044***  0.013** 0.012** 0.045*** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.012)  (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) 
(1)*(5)  
0.196** 0.269***  
 
0.08 0.132** 
 
(0.086) (0.086)  
 
(0.058) (0.057) 
(2)*(5)  
0.097 0.128**  
 
0.048 0.067* 
 
(0.060) (0.059)  
 
(0.040) (0.040) 
(3)*(6)   
-0.220***  
  
-0.171*** 
  
(0.051)  
  
(0.034) 
(4)*(6)   
0.385***  
  
0.261*** 
  
(0.048)  
  
(0.032) 
Constant 
7.875*** 9.129*** 7.102***  6.656*** 7.222*** 5.695*** 
(1.398) (1.489) (1.511)  (0.929) (0.991) (1.002) 
CRS Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
STIM Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
IND Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
PROV_GDP Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Mundlak Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6078 6078 6078  6078 6078 6078 
Firms 1605 1605 1605  1605 1605 1605 
Within Group R2 0.288 0.29 0.313  0.368 0.369 0.389 
Between Group R2 0.459 0.459 0.449  0.334 0.334 0.344 
Overall R2 0.366 0.367 0.374  0.363 0.363 0.376 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
           * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
